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Abstract
The popularity of Twitter for information discovery, coupled with the automatic shortening
of URLs to save space, given the 140 character limit, provides cyber criminals with an
opportunity to obfuscate the URL of a malicious Web page within a tweet. Once the URL
is obfuscated the cyber criminal can lure a user to click on it with enticing text and images
before carrying out a cyber attack using a malicious Web server. This is known as a drive-by-
download. In a drive-by-download a user’s computer system is infected while interacting with
the malicious endpoint, often without them being made aware the attack has taken place.
An attacker can gain control of the system by exploiting unpatched system vulnerabilities
and this form of attack currently represents one of the most common methods employed. In
this paper we build a machine learning model using machine activity data and tweet meta
data to move beyond post-execution classification of such URLs as malicious, to predict a
URL will be malicious with 99.2% F-measure (using 10-fold cross validation) and 83.98%
(using an unseen test set) at 1 second into the interaction with the URL. Thus providing
a basis from which to kill the connection to the server before an attack has completed and
proactively blocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later
date.
Keywords: Cyber security, Drive by Download, Malware, Machine Learning, Web Security
1. Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have emerged as powerful tools for disseminating in-
formation. Among these, Twitter, a micro-blogging website that allows its users to express
themselves in 140 characters, has emerged as a go-to source for current affairs, entertainment
news and to seek information about global events in real-time. For example, Twitter has
been used to study public reaction to events such as natural disasters [1], political elections
[2] and terrorist attacks [3]. The England versus Iceland football match at the European
Football Championships (Euro 2016) was one of the most tweeted about events of 2016 -
attracting 2.1 million users [4]. This high volume of users around a popular trending event
and Twitter’s inbuilt feature of shortening a URL due to its 140 character restriction pro-
vides cyber criminals with an opportunity to obfuscate links to malicious Web pages within
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tweets and carry out a drive by download attack. In a drive-by-download [5, 6] an attacker
attempts to lure users to malicious Web pages so that they can hijack the user’s system by
exploiting a system vulnerability. By successfully carrying out these attacks an attacker is
able to, for example, obtain remote access, steal user information, or make the computer
part of a botnet [7].
The more popular OSNs become, the more attractive a platform they become for cyber crim-
inals to conduct their attacks. Microsoft acknowledged this fast growing threat of malicious
Web pages as one the top threats in their security and intelligence report published in 2013
[8] and the detection of drive by download attacks remains an important topic of research.
The problem has been broadly investigated from a number of perspectives including: (i)
characteristics of OSN user accounts (e.g. posting behaviours [9] and social network links
[10]); (ii) characteristics of URLs (e.g. lexical features [11] and endpoint activity [12, 13]);
and (iii) analysing the code of a Web page in a static or dynamic manner to study its in-
tended or actual behaviour when interacting with the underlying system on which the OSN
user is accessing the Web page.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel real time machine classification method
that is based on the behavioural fingerprint of a shortened URL when an OSN user loads
it into their web browser. By capturing machine activity metrics (e.g. CPU use, RAM use,
Network I/O - for full list see Appendix 1) and tweet attributes, we are able to predict
whether the URL is pointing to a malicious Web page with 99.2% f-measure (using 10-fold
cross validation) and 83.98% (using an unseen test set) at 1 second into the interaction with
a URL. This provides a novel contribution with which it is possible to kill the connection
to the server before an attack has completed - thus proactively blocking and preventing an
attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first study to proactively predict a drive by download attack by classifying a
URL during interaction, rather than requiring the malicious payload to complete before
classification.
2. Related work
In this section we discuss the related work on the topic of detecting malicious content in
online social networks. This is presented in two sub-sections - we first look at detecting such
content using OSN user account and URL characteristics, and then study the use of static
and dynamic code analysis. Using tweet meta-data Kristina and Rumi followed various
top stories and used various tweet attributes to demonstrate how rapidly information (e.g.
malicious URLs) can be disseminated in Twitter [14] making it the core focus for existing
work in this area - so the majority of the related work focusses on Twitter and tweet meta-
data. It should be noted though that malicious URLs and spam are a significant issue on
all OSNs. Table 1 provides a summary of related work and the methods used at a high level
for comparison.
2.1. Detecting Malicious Content based on OSN account and URL characteristics
Previous research has aimed to identify tweets that are classified as spam or contain a
URL pointing to a malicious Web server based on tweet meta-data. The rationale being that
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Table 1: Malware or Spam detection techniques used
Techniques used to detect Spam/Malware on Twitter
Methods Used
by Researchers
Tweet Attributes
Blacklist
cross check
Lexical analysis
of URL
HoneyPot or
Honey profiles
Machine Behaviour
(Network ,File,Process,
Memory,CPU etc)
User Behaviour
on Twitter
OSN Account
Characteristics[14] [9] [15] [16]
[17] [18] [19] [20] [10][21]
URL characteristics[12][13][11]
Detect By analysing
Static Code[22][23] [24]
Detect By analysing
Dynamic Code[5][25][26][27]
[28][3][29]
(network only)
Our Model
it is possible to differentiate between a ’normal’ user and that of a cyber criminal based on
user account characteristics extracted from meta-data such as number of followers, number
of people they follow, their posting behaviour etc. Their research identified tweet attributes
that can be used to detect accounts that exhibit abnormal behaviour (e.g. posting spam or
malicious URLs). Cao and Caverlee analyzed the behaviour of Twitter users to detect tweets
classified as spam, using meta-data from the user account posting the spam or URL and
the user account clicking the URL [9]. Their hypothesis was based on the assumption that
it is difficult to manipulate such behavioural signals. Chen et al. [16] used a Finite State
Machine based spam template, demonstrating that a cyber criminal can create 2000 tweets
from a single template and discovering that such users were using multiple accounts to post
spam in a coordinated manner to avoid detection. They were exhibiting ”load balancing” -
a technique frequently used to prevent denial of service attack- but in this case posting from
multiple account to prevent being detected. Stringhini et. al. created honey profiles on the
top three OSNs and recorded the content and interactions made to these profiles to identify
tweet attributes contributing to malware propagation [17]. Benevenuto et al. focused on
identifying spam centred around Twitter exclusively by using twenty three tweet attributes
[18]. Grier et al. analysed spam behaviour and the effectiveness of using a blacklist of
URLs to detect spam on Twitter[19]. They analysed spam behaviour of tweets by recording
the frequency of tweet being posted. Yang et al. [10] used features based on timing and
automation to detect spam on Twitter. Their research was focused on the relationship
such as betweeness centrality and bidirectional link ratio between spam nodes and their
neighbouring nodes. The same authors collaborated with Zhang and Shin[20] to analyse
the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twitter studying inner and outer social relationships. The
inner social relationship hypothesised that criminal accounts are interconnected. The outer
social relationship highlighted those accounts that follow a criminal account and help each
criminal account to be well hidden in the network. Similarly a feature based approach was
employed by [21] by building a classifier to detect fake accounts created by cyber criminals
to inflate the number of followers.
To date the research has been focused on studying OSN accounts and URL characteristics
to identify those tweets or accounts that are exhibiting deviant behaviour (posting spam or
malicious URLs). Providing evidence that OSN accounts or URLs may be malicious can be
beneficial but given the frequency and volume at which new accounts emerge, the only way
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to determine actual malicious behaviour is occurring is to observe it. Once malicious activity
occurs it is currently not possible to flag it and stop it. None of the methods published to
date allow us to observe malicious activity and block it to minimise the damage. Thus we
propose to build on the existing literature that uses characteristics as features and include
them in a predictive model that will incorporate tweet attributes to predict that the URL is
likely to perform malicious activity during the early stages of interaction, providing a novel
enhancement to the research field whereby we can observe malicious behaviour, including
that of newly created accounts with limited account history, and block it before maximum
damage occurs.
2.2. Detecting malicious content by analysing the static or dynamic activity of a Web page
There are two ways to analyse the activity of a Web page. Static analysis looks at the
code that drives the page, looking for recognised malicious code and methods. Dynamic
analysis executes the code by interacting with the Web page and observes the behaviour
on the endpoint and on the local system, also looking for evidence of known malicious
activity but also enabling a more broad analysis of observable activity. Static analysis:
McGrath and Gupta analysed the anatomy of phishing URLs, studying the patterns of
characters and domain length in URLs to develop a filter to detect phishing URLs [22]. In a
similar approach an automated classification model was built based on lexical and host based
features to detect malicious URL using statistical models [11]. Canali et. al. developed a
filter called Prophiler [23] that uses features derived from URLs and Web page code to
determine whether a drive by download will occur. In another approach Kapravelos et al.
compared similarities between various JavaScript programs to detect malicious Web pages
[24].
Dynamic analysis: A system was develop by Cova et al to detect malicious Web pages in
two stages[5]. In the first stage various features such as URL redirects, length of dynamic
code, number of dynamic execution class etc. were used to detect an anomaly. In the second
part they used a custom built browser to open the URL and record the events used to detect
malicious behaviour. Building on the principle of detecting malware by analysing dynamic
execution of code Kim et al. proposed a model to systematically explore possible execution
paths and reveal malicious behaviours based on the execution paths [25]. This is achieved
by analysing function parameters that could expose suspicious DOM injection and reveal
malicious behaviour. In a similar approach, Javasinghe et al. used the dynamic behaviour
of a Web page to detect a drive by download attack [26]. Abobe Flash animations are a
well known entry point for Web-based attacks and these have been studied at various levels
during the interpreters loading and execution process to detect malicious code [27]. Research
has also been undertaken to build a machine classifier based on network activity to detect
malware. In one approach Bartos and Sofka looked at network traffic to build the classifier
from data captured in the form of proxy logs generated by 80 international companies [28].
By doing so they were able to detect both known as well as previously unseen security threats
based on network traffic. Similarly, Burnap et al. built a real time classifier specific to drive
by downloads originating from Twitter based on network activity and machine activity [3].
Looking at the dynamic redirection of Web pages has been proposed to detect phishing
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and spamming webpages in [12, 13]. This was extended to using forward and graph based
features in [29].
In summary, while excellent results have been achieved by studying the static or dynamic
activity of a Web page, the focus has been on detection. As stated at the end of the previous
section, to identify malicious activity in OSN it must be observed, and generally once it is
observed, it is a problem that needs to be remedied. As with the research in the previous
section, none of the research to date that focuses on Web page activity has proposed a
model capable of observing and potentially blocking malicious activity. Thus, in this paper
we focus on prediction, proposing a model that can classify a URL into malicious or benign
based on OSN account attributes (as per the previous section) and also dynamic machine
behaviour - activity observed when the URL is clicked and the Web page is being loaded.
The aim is to predict that behaviour observed in the early stages of loading a Web page is
likely to lead to malicious activity at a later stage - providing new capability for a user to
block the completion of the malicious actions rather than depend on detection and repair
at a significant cost and inconvenience.
3. Experimental Setup
3.1. Data Collection
We collected data around two popular sporting events that were expected to attract
a large number of users. This made them potential targets for cyber criminals to carry
out drive by download attacks. For our experiments we identified the European Football
Championships (#Euro2016) and the Olympics (#Rio2016) in 2016. Both generated some
of the largest volumes of tweets in 2016. Tweets containing a URL and hashtags relating to
these events were captured via the Twitter streaming API. The rationale behind selecting
two events was to the determine whether our predictive model would generalise beyond a
single event and be applicable for use on URLs posted around other events. For Euro 2016
we captured tweets from the period of 10 June to 14 July 2016 using the hashtag #Euro2016.
We harvested 3,154,605 tweets that contained a URL. During the opening ceremony that
marked the opening of the Olympics in 2016 (the peak of public interest) we captured 148,881
tweets that contained a URL using the the hashtag #Rio2016. From the captured tweets
we selected a systematic sample of 7500 unique tweets to identify 975 malicious URLs for
European Football Championships dataset and around 5000 tweets were used to identified
around 525 malicious unique tweets for Olympics 2016 dataset by using a high interaction
client side honeypot. High interaction honeypots perform dynamic analysis of interaction
behaviour between a client machine and that of a Web server. For our experimental results
we used CaptureHPC toolkit [30]. CaptureHPC operates by visiting each URL that is passed
to it through a virtualised Sandboxed environment - interacting with the Web page for a
pre-defined amount of time. At the end of the interaction time Capture HPC determines if
any system-level operations have occurred including file, process and registry changes made
to the system. Based on these changes it classifies that URL into malicious or benign [31].
The classification is based on an exclusion list that is created based on known file, process or
registry entries that are targeted by drive by download attacks. This exclusion list is updated
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every 14 days to reflect the most recent actions that have been observed in drive by download
attacks. The exclusion list contain rules that are identified while visiting malicious or benign
Web sites. CaptureHPC therefore gives us a label we can use for supervised learning and a
set of activity logs we can use to train a system to recognise the ’early warning signals’ that
are present before the exclusion list flag would have been raised.
Figure 1: Architecture of Predictive Model
3.2. Architecture of the Predictive Model
The predictive model has three main components (see Fig. 1): feature extraction, per-
sistent storage and machine learning. The main function of feature extraction is to create
a timeline of measurable observations on the client system in terms of machine activity and
tweet attributes from the time a URL is opened to the point at which a drive by download
is carried out or system becomes idle. The feature extractor opens each URL that is passed
to it in a Sandboxed environment and starts creating snapshots of machine activity at time
interval ’t’ for a period of ’p’. For our experiment, t=1 second and the observation period
is defined as p=10 seconds. The first snapshot is generated when a URL is ’clicked’ at t=1
second, and then subsequently at an interval of t. Each snapshot is written to a database for
persistence as the Sandboxed environment is wiped clean after each URL has been visited.
Each database insert includes (i) machine activity and (ii) meta data of the tweet containing
the URL. For machine activity we log 54 metrics including network activity, file, process,
registry, RAM use, CPU usage (see Appendix 1 for a longer list and associated Pearson
correlation scores with the malicious/benign class). We also use 24 pieces of meta data from
the tweet, including user name, user screen name, user id, follower count, friends count, and
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age of account (see Appendix 1 for longer list). This produces 78 attributes every second for
a period of p. During the training phase we know whether the URL is malicious or benign
based on the results from CaptureHPC. This label is inserted into the database with each
snapshot. Once the observation time is complete, the Sandboxed environment is reset to a
malware-free state so that each new URL can be opened in a known malware free configu-
ration with a consistent baseline.
The third component is the machine learning phase. For our predictive model we trained
four different machine algorithms to determine the best method for class prediction using
these data. We used the Weka toolkit to compare the predictive accuracy of (i) generative
models that consider conditional dependencies in the dataset (BayesNet) or assume con-
ditional independence (Naive Bayes), and (ii) discriminative models that aim to maximise
information gain (J48 Decision Tree) and build multiple models to map input to output
via a number of connected nodes, even if the feature space is hard to linearly separate
(Multi-layer Perceptron). To test the models we used the feature extractor and the learned
machine learning model from the training phase. Tweets from the testing dataset (in the
first instance using 10-fold cross validation, and later using a holdout testing dataset) were
passed into the feature extractor, which opened the URL in the Sandboxed environment and
created the machine activity and tweet meta-data snapshots at every time interval. Each
snapshot was passed onto the learned model which classified the snapshot as malicious or
benign. If the result was ’benign’, the process continues to the next snapshot. The first time
the outcome is ’malicious’, the process stops and the URL is classified as malicious, killing
the connection to the Web page.
The framework is designed to be adaptive to an ever-changing environment by periodically
updated the labelling method used to train and test the classifier so that new malware be-
haviour is reflected in the labels. This is achieved by periodically updating the exclusion
list of the honeypot. The exclusion list is updated once every 14 days by running URLs
in CaptureHPC after executing them in known malware labelling Web sites like Virustotal
[32], which provide labels based on the leading commercial anti-virus tools. Based on the
machine activity observed in terms of files/process/registry we update the exclusion list [31].
4. Results
4.1. Training on data from Euro 2016
To determine which models provide the best predictive power - not just overall classifi-
cation accuracy on all data - each model was trained and tested using data from sequential,
cumulative time intervals. That is, at each time interval t from t = 1 to t = p where p is
the total number of time intervals (in this case p = 10), each model was trained and tested
using data from t=1-to-p where p=p+1. Each interval was evaluated with ten fold cross
validation using the Weka toolkit. The results were calculated using standard classification
metrics - Precision, Recall, and F-Measure.
The results for for each classifier are presented in Figure 2. In each sub-figure, the machine
learning model is trained and tested on the metrics derived using the Euro2016 data-set.
Time in each table represents the time in seconds elapsed from the time the URL was
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(a) F-Measure of Naive Bayes over time
during training phase
(b) F-Measure of BayesNet over time
during training phase
(c) F-Measure of J48 over time during
training phase
(d) F-Measure of MLP over time during
training phase
Figure 2: F-Measure of all machine learning algorithm over time during training phase
clicked, and the starting point is defined as t = 1. For example Time=2 means 1 second
has elapsed since the URL has been ’clicked’ (URL clicked at t = 1). Models built using
the Naive Bayes and J48 algorithms (see Figures 2a and 2c) exhibit similar behaviour - they
both have a dip in accuracy from the starting point and then it gradually continues to rise
up. One explanation for this could be that during early seconds there is a lack of system
activity (see Figure 3), leaving the algorithm struggling to differentiate between benign and
malicious activity. The F-measure of the J48 machine learning model follows the trend of
machine activity and continues to rise as more activity is recorded. When we compare the
generative probabilistic models (Naive Bayes and BayesNet) we find that BayesNet out-
performs NaiveBayes, suggesting interdependencies between attributes. This is logical as,
for instance, when malicious network activity occurs is likely that CPU and RAM use will
also spike due to additional resource being required for the activity. Looking at the results
of the MLP model (see Figure 2d) we see the model is able to better weight the machine
activity and tweet meta-data to control for the lack of machine activity at the start of the
interaction. The F-measure rises smoothly from 1 second, suggesting it is making better use
of the Twitter metadata to improve accuracy in the early stages of activity. In terms highest
F-measure achieved, the J48 and MLP models perform best with 0.998 at 10 seconds. At 3
seconds the results are almost identical. The key difference between models being a slight
improvement in MLP at 2 seconds, but this is countered by the speed at which J48 returns
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Figure 3: Machine activity over time
a result. The MLP result takes longer than a second to be returned, whereas the J48 takes
milliseconds. Thus, in practical application, the J48 model is most likely to be favourable.
4.2. Training Model without Online Social Network Platform attributes
A lot of research has been done in the past to detect malicious/spam tweets propagating
on Twitter based on tweet attributes [17, 18, 19, 20, 10, 21]. Thus we included tweet meta
data as part of the feature set for prediction in the previous section. However, these features
are quite ideosyncratic and not consistent across different OSNs. For instance, if we wanted
to predict a drive by download via other OSNs such as Facebook, Tumblr or Instagram, we
would get a slightly different set of user characteristics from the metadata available. Thus,
we aimed to determine the impact of removing these features and use machine activity data
alone to determine the applicability of our method across different OSNs. To conduct this
experiment we selected the model from the previous experiment that provided us the best
performance - the J48 algorithm that displayed apparent correlation with machine activity.
We retrained the model using only the machine activity - no tweet metadata. Table 2 and
Figure 4 show performance of the of the model over time.
Figure 4 shows the precision metrics for the J48 model when trained with and without
tweet meta data. When we compare the precision of both J48 models we observe that the
model built solely on machine activity data fluctuates over time. The model F-measure
drops by around 13% at t=1 second. This suggests that Twitter’s idiosyncratic attributes
such as number of followers significantly contribute to accurate classification of malicious
URLs but that the model is still highly accurate when using machine activity alone, making
it likely that the approach would work to detect drive-by-downloads on other OSNs.
Without the OSN metadata the model seems able to better cope with the low rate
of activity at the start of the interaction, which is interesting as this is the opposite of the
situation when metadata were used to train the model. The key finding here is that including
the OSN metadata improves the prediction of the classifier by 12.98%, thus in future our
aim will be to try and retain user account characteristics where possible when applied to
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Table 2: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using J48 Algorithm without Tweet Meta data
Euro 2016 Train Model -J48
(Without Tweets Meta data)
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.89 0.863 0.858
2 0.945 0.94 0.939
3 0.909 0.9 0.901
4 0.92 0.904 0.905
5 0.928 0.916 0.915
6 0.914 0.899 0.897
7 0.915 0.899 0.897
8 0.929 0.918 0.918
9 0.941 0.933 0.933
10 0.952 0.947 0.947
Figure 4: Train J48 Model without OSN meta data
OSNs outside of Twitter - but that our model still provide a high predictive performance
even without these data, providing promising results for the application of machine activity
models for predicting malicious behaviour in URLs on multiple OSN platforms.
4.3. Testing using unseen data from Olympics 2016
In the previous two experiments we validated our predictive models using a single dataset
from Euro 2016 and obtained promising results. One possible limitation with this experiment
is that cyber attack methods vary over time. For instance, in a second unrelated event we
may see a new collection of individuals spreading malicious URLs, and indeed a different
behavioural profile exhibited by the URLs. We therefore now introduce an unseen dataset
from the Olympics 2016. This dataset has played no part in training the model so is
completely unseen, testing the generality of the approach to some degree. Given that J48,
MLP and Naive Bayes (NB) models performed best on the Euro 2016 data, we combined
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Table 3: Test Model On Olympics 2016 Dataset
Test Olympics -Vote Algorithm
(NaiveBayes and J48)
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.84 0.733 0.74
2 0.871 0.841 0.839
3 0.879 0.854 0.852
4 0.873 0.845 0.842
5 0.881 0.859 0.856
6 0.882 0.865 0.862
7 0.847 0.83 0.825
8 0.806 0.801 0.798
9 0.724 0.722 0.722
10 0.637 0.619 0.616
Figure 5: Testing on Olympics Data using model built earlier
these using a Vote meta-classifier. The Vote algorithm allows two or more machine learning
algorithms to be combined in such a way that the the label likelihood from each model
is used to provide the classification label for each test instance. In our case we used the
average probability as the decision point. Through experimentation we narrowed down
two combinations of methods that produced the highest accuracy: J48 & NaiveBayes and
NaiveBayes & MLP. Figure 5 shows the F-measure for both. The combination of J48 with
NaiveBayes reaches an F-measure of 0.85 after just two seconds into the interaction with a
Web page. Note again that t=1 is the time the test machine launches the URL so there is a
lag of 1 second, meaning t=3 is actually 2 seconds after the URL is clicked. The NaiveBayes
and MLP combination reaches a maximum F-measure of 75.3%. Thus there is a significant
performance difference when combining the Naive Bayes and J48 models. This is somewhat
counter intuitive given the MLP and J48 algorithms were almost indistinguishable at 3
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Figure 6: Comparison of Results on Unseen Data with and without tweet metadata
seconds in the previous experiments, and that J48 is a rule-based model. We would expect a
rule-based model to overfit to a single event (i.e. the CPU, RAM and network traffic would
have a large variance between events as demonstrated by [3]). This was not the case, and
in fact this combination produced a model that is capable of detecting malicious URLs in
an unseen dataset with 85% accuracy at only 2 seconds into the interaction.
We next rebuilt the Vote model with and without tweet meta data meta data. Figure 6
shows the result of the classifier when we tested this model on the Olympics 2016 (unseen)
dataset. We see a significant increase (on average an increase of 32% was observed) in
precision of the classifier when tweet attributes were added to machine data. This suggests
that even though there is similarity in tweet attributes across events they are not enough
to accurately classify a URL on their own, and we still require machine data to improve
our classification across events. Note also that the the results of the same models based on
tweet meta data alone using the Olympics 2016 dataset gave an F-measure of only 16% (full
results not shown for brevity). We can see that while the attack vectors as measured by
system activity are changing between events (hence the drop in performance when remove
the Twitter metadata), the combination of network characteristics of the individuals posting
malicious URLs, and machine activity recorded while interaction with URLs, remain fairly
stable - showing a drop in F-measure from 0.977 to 0.839 at 2 seconds between events. Our
model may therefore not be limited to a single case, but could be applied to multiple events
on Twitter maintaining reasonably low error rates when predicting malicious URLs just 2
seconds into the interaction.
4.4. Adaptive nature of the predictive model
To make our predictive model adaptive, a feed-forward architecture was implemented
(see Figure 1). The rationale was to ensure that new techniques employed by cyber crimi-
nals to carry out a drive by download attack, as captured in the form of machine activity,
are continually captured and considered while training the model. In order to check the
effectiveness of the feed-forward architecture in achieving this we conducted a further exper-
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Figure 7: Comparing classifier accuracy in terms of F-measure when data set is changed
iment. We trained the model on the Euro 2016 dataset with varying sample sizes, and tested
using 10 fold cross validation. We then tested the model on an unseen dataset (Olympics
2016), with the hypothesis that increasing the size of a dataset would capture new machine
behaviour that would increase the diversity of features seen by the model and improve the
overall F-measure of the predictive model.
We used a range of sample sizes for model training - 1%,5%, 10% ,25%, 50% and 100%.
Figure 7 displays the results of these experiments.
We found that while training the model with only 1% of total sample size, using 10 cross
fold technique, it produced an F-Measure of 0.89. However, when we tested the model on
an unseen dataset we found the F-measure dropped to 0.533. By increasing the size of the
training dataset from 1% to 100% in various stages we aimed to simulate how the model
would behave as new data is added to the model time and the feature diversity increases.
We observed that the F-measure did indeed increase with increases in dataset size during
the training phase as well as with the testing phase, showing the model to be adaptive when
observing more diverse machine behaviour. We saw a significant jump in the F-measure
(from 0.54 to 0.80) when the sample size was increased to 10%. However, little change in
the F-measure was observed when we increased the sample size from 25% to 100%, suggesting
that 25% of data representing machine activity is enough to build a model that will give
us over 83% F-measure. After this point more data does not appear to improve prediction
accuracy.
5. Conclusions
As Online Social Networks (OSNs) become a key source of information publication and
propagation following global events it has become an environment that is particularly vul-
nerable to cyber attack via the injection of shortened URLs that take the user to a malicious
server from which a ’drive by download’ attack on the local machine is launched. In this
paper we aimed to build on a body of work that has developed methods to identify malicious
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URLs in OSNs in an effort to combat the problem. Existing work has developed methods to
provide evidence that OSN accounts or URLs may be malicious, which can be beneficial, but
given the frequency and volume at which new accounts emerge, the only way to determine
actual malicious behaviour is occurring is to observe it. Once malicious activity occurs it
was previously not possible to flag it and stop it. None of the methods published prior to
this work allowed us to observe malicious activity and block it to minimise the damage.
The main focus of our research was therefore to develop a method capable of identifying a
URL as malicious or benign based on machine activity metrics generated and logged during
interaction with a URL endpoint, and OSN user account attributes (in this case Twitter
users) associated with the URL. Furthermore, the aim was to predict that the URL was
likely to be malicious within seconds of opening the interaction - before the drive by down-
load attack could complete the execution of its payload. This is the first time a method has
been tested to predict a malicious outcome before it actually takes place - existing literature
always classified URLs using all the data generated throughout an interaction period - so
provided a post-hoc result, or without actually observing the malicious activity - making a
decision based on previously observed behaviour .
We captured tweets containing URLs around two global sporting events. Our system
produced a second-by-second time series of system-level activity (e.g. CPU use, RAM use,
network traffic etc.) during visitation of a Web page. We trained the classification model
using four different types of machine learning algorithm on log files generated from one
event (Euro 2016). The model was then validated using tweets captured during another
event (Olympics 2016). The rationale was to determine if similar machine activity and tweet
attributes were exhibited in two completely different events (i.e. does the model generalise
beyond a single event). A ten fold cross validation was performed to train the model and
an accuracy of around 99% was achieved by using the log files generated at 1 second into
the interaction with a Web server, and a maximum of 99.8% at time=10 seconds. One of
the interesting observations during training phase was that by using tweet attributes we
can increase the accuracy by 12.98% during training and around 32% during testing phase
when compared to machine activity alone, showing that the Twitter metadata exhibited by
cyber criminals to carry out drive by download attacks were relatively stable, while the URL
behaviour changed.
When tested using an unseen dataset (Olympics 2016) we achieved an accuracy of 83.9%
from log files generated at 2 seconds - that is 1 second after launching the URL. The
highest accuracy achieved on the unseen event was 86% at around 4 seconds from the time
the URL was launched. Our model may therefore not be limited to a single case, but
could be applied to multiple events on Twitter maintaining reasonably low error rates when
predicting malicious URLs just 1 second into the interaction. The model allows us to reduce
the detection time of a malicious URL from minutes - the time taken to run the URL in a
secure sandbox environment - to 4 seconds, with an accuracy of 86% on an unseen dataset.
Furthermore it allows us to stop the execution process with 84% accuracy just 1 second after
clicking the URL, preventing full execution of the malicious payload, rather than detecting
the malicious action retrospectively and having to repair the system. Future work includes
increasing the granularity further by creating log files at shorter intervals to determine if we
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can detect malicious URLs even earlier in the execution cycle, to avoid the key limitation
which is that a cyber criminal can evade detection if the connection is dropped within one
second.
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Table 4: Feature Selection of Attributes using Pearson’s R Correlation between attributes and its class
(Malicious/benign)
Sr No Pearsons Correlation Attribute Name Sr No Pearsons Correlation Attribute Name
1 0.4059 Process Create Time 32 0.0184 retweet user screem name
2 0.2950 disk io counter write bytes 33 0.0175 user time zone
3 0.2915 disk memory free 34 0.0172 retweet user verified
4 0.2915 disk memory used 35 0.0151 disk io counter read times
5 0.2914 disk memory percent 36 0.0138 user language
6 0.2621 CPU 37 0.0137 process id net
7 0.1125 user verified 38 0.0133 age
8 0.0981 virtual memory percent 39 0.0132 retweet user timezone
9 0.0974 virtual memory available 40 0.0103 retweet favourite tweet count
10 0.0974 virtual memory free 41 0.0091 retweet user id
11 0.0974 virtual memory used 42 0.0082 disk io counter write times
12 0.0939 Packets received 43 0.0074 process username
13 0.0935 Bytes received 44 0.0072 retweet user favourites count
14 0.0891 disk io counter read bytes 45 0.0069 memory percent
15 0.0885 swap memory free 46 0.0063 process path
16 0.0885 swap memory used 47 0.0062 process name
17 0.0874 swap memory percentage 48 0.0061 process status
18 0.0799 Packets Sent 49 0.0061 remote ip
19 0.0647 disk io counter write count 50 0.0061 connection Establish listen
20 0.0638 user friends count 51 0.0061 user coordinates
21 0.0627 disk io counter read count 52 0.0047 process id
22 0.0617 Bytes Sent 53 0.0043 source path
23 0.0548 user name 54 0.0036 cmd line statement
24 0.0495 retweet user name 55 0.0036 process exe path
25 0.0368 retweet retweet count 56 0.0036 cpu time user
26 0.0292 user screen name 57 0.0034 retweet user friends count
27 0.0261 user location 58 0.0023 retweet user followers count
28 0.0234 user followers count 59 0.0010 cpu time system
29 0.0214 type 60 0.0006 port number
31 0.0186 retweet user location 61 0.0000 swap memory swap in
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